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ABSTRACT
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continues to embrace and connect 
China with European Union (EU) Member countries; the latest in 2019 
with Italy, a G-7 member, also joining. EU members participating in the
BRI include Poland, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia. While Germany and 
France lead the EU in trade and investment with China, political winds 
may be blowing. The EU has noticed that the seventeen Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEEC) under the “17+1” format, a majority of which 
are EU members, are capturing greater amounts of Chinese trade under 
their BRI cooperation agreements; CEEC trade reportedly totaling over
$82 billion in 2018. EU officials are increasingly critical of the 17+1 and 
wary that the mechanism could further undermine and divide EU unity on
policies toward China.
In 2016, the European Commission Joint Communication on Elements 
for a New EU Strategy on China insisted that any bilateral relations with
China—including in-group settings such as the 17+1 format—should
be coordinated with the EU to ensure that relevant aspects are “in line with
EU law, rules and policies, and that the overall outcome is beneficial for 
the EU as a whole.” Current EU policies and regulations require that process. 
Poland is one of the largest countries in this group and has important 
ports along one of China’s strategic BRI corridors. Chinese investments
in Poland were estimated between 130 million and one billion Euros from 
2016 to 2017. Poland offers China several assets—proximity to key
partners in Western Europe, access to the sea or convenient road and rail
connections, and access to a qualified workforce. 
Labor issues are also a factor in Chinese investment in Poland and the
CEEC. Chinese investors, particularly the large SOEs, frequently bring 
much of their own workforce with them. Poland and other CEEC with low 
wage levels have been experiencing a labor exodus of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) workers and an introduction of many foreign workers. With 
the wage levels in China and Poland not so disparate, both factors could 
allow a positive fit under BRI. 
Attention is given to the relevancy and implications, including legal 
limitations on foreign trade agreements (FTA) for EU members in the 
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CEEC, relevant EU Directives, and international treaties influencing a
future EU-China FTA. 
Discussion includes whether Poland and the CEEC/17+1’s developing
BRI relationship with China might divide the EU or facilitate a pathway 
to an eventual EU-China FTA which places trade and investment under
the EU. This could diminish the competitive labor advantages of Poland 
and the CEEC. 
I. INTRODUCTION
A group of 17 Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) is also 
known as the “17+1.”1 Each country has a cooperation agreement with 
China for participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).2 The 17+1
framework began in 2012 when China convened eleven European Union 
(EU) member states and five EU candidate countries—all in Central and 
Eastern Europe—for meetings with China, resulting in cooperation agreements 
with China to participate in the BRI.3 With the addition of Greece in 
August 2018, the 16+1 became the “17+1.”4 Since then, other EU countries, 
such as Portugal (December 5, 2018) and Italy (March 23, 2019),5 also signed 
on as members participating in the BRI, though they are not members of 
the 17+1.6 
 1. Wang Yiwei, China and Europe: BRI and the 17+1 Initiative, VALDAI (Jan. 28, 
2020), https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/china-and-europe-bri-and-the-17-1-initiative/ [https:// 
perma.cc/8K4Q-9Q4H].
2. Id.
 3. See China, the 16+1 Format and the EU, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 625.173 (Sept. 
2018); see also Jonathan E. Hillman & Maesea McCalpin, Will China’s ‘16+1’ Format Divide 
Europe?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/
will-chinas-161-format-divide-europe [https://perma.cc/E3LF-4CP4].
 4. Horia Ciurtin, The “16+1” Becomes the “17+1”: Greece Joins China’s Dwindling 
Cooperation Framework in Central and Eastern Europe, THE JAMESTOWN FOUND. (May
29, 2019, 5:54 PM), https://jamestown.org/program/the-161-becomes-the-171-greece-
joins-chinas-dwindling-cooperation-framework-in-central-and-eastern-europe/ [https://perma.
cc/4W3R-WATY]. 
5. Liu Zhen, Portugal Signs Agreement with China on Belt and Road Initiative, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 5, 2018, 08:30 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/
diplomacy/article/2176560/portugal-wavers-xi-jinping-presses-europe-belt-and-road 
[https://perma.cc/L557-SNZ6].
 6. Valbona Zeneli, Italy Signs on to Belt and Road Initiative: EU-China Relations at 














   
  
   
  
 
   
  
    
 
 
    
    
     
  
As the largest country in the region, Poland has the potential to be at the 
center of the BRI in the CEEC, which would bring an advantageous 
geostrategic location with great economic potential.7 On June 21, 2016, 
following discussions on increased cooperation, the presidents of Poland 
and China issued a joint statement that established a comprehensive, strategic 
partnership between Poland and China.8 The joint statement explains,
“Poland and China see each other as long-term and stable strategic partners 
and their development as a significant opportunity for mutually beneficial 
9cooperation.”  Additionally, Poland and China signed memorandums 
of understanding regarding the development of the “Silk Road” and 
strengthening investment cooperation in logistics infrastructure.10 They
also “declared activities promoting cooperation within the Polish Plan for 
Responsible Development and the Chinese ‘Belt and Road Initiative.’”11 
The EU has expressed concern about China’s competition and penetration 
into EU markets through the CEEC.12 The EU Commission previously put
forth its alternative to BRI in its Strategy on Connecting Europe and Euro-
Memorandum is a non-binding statement of intent, through which Italy expresses
its commitment to the initiative. It does not create rights and obligations under
international law as a treaty would do. The Memorandum, however, represents
an umbrella deal under which 29 other commercial and institutional agreements
amounting to €2.5 billion were made. 
Femke van der Eijk & Angela Pandita Gunavardana, The Road that Divided the 
EU: Italy Joins China’s Belt and Road Initiative, EUR. L. BLOG (June 25, 2019), 
https://europeanlawblog.eu/2019/06/25/the-road-that-divided-the-eu-italy-joins-chinas-
belt-and-road-initiative/ [https://perma.cc/AP72-5USV]. See also Andrew Chatzky, China’s
Belt and Road Gets a Win in Italy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 27, 2019), https:// 
www.cfr.org/in-brief/chinas-belt-and-road-gets-win-italy [https://perma.cc/6ZAN-X5V9].
7. Mercy A. Kuo, China in Eastern Europe: Poland’s Perspective, DIPLOMAT 
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/china-in-eastern-europe-polands-perspective/
[https://perma.cc/48RP-9X83].
8. Id.
9. “The joint declaration also refers, among others, to the deepening of cooperation
in the areas of economy and trade, finances, transport and logistics, infrastructure, civil 
aviation, energy, agriculture and commerce, technology and environmental protection.” 
Press Release, Office of the President of the Republic of Poland, Poland and China Sign 
Strategic Partnership Declaration (June 20, 2016), https://www.president.pl/en/news/art, 
190,poland-and-china-sign-strategic-partnership-declaration.html [https://perma.cc/U7KY-
VA3P] [hereinafter Press Release].
10. Id. “Poland was one of the first countries to sign a memorandum of understanding
with China about the BRI in 2015.” Meiling Chen, Poland Looking to Bolster Trade with 
China Under BRI, CHINA DAILY (May 28, 2019, 10:07 AM), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ 
a/201905/28/WS5cec97dca3104842260be305.html [https://perma.cc/434Y-ZFFP]. 
11. Press Release, supra note 9; see also Joint Communication to the European 
Parliament, the European Union and the Council EU-China – A Strategic Outlook, COM 
(2019) 5 final (Dec. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Strategic Outlook].
12. Chatzky, supra note 6.
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Asia,13 “based on Western economic and institutional norms and principles, 
‘a document that completely ignores the BRI.’”14 The EU and China created 
an EU-China Connectivity Platform to discuss common issues and economic 
development.15 Additionally, the EU developed a “Cohesion Fund” to
support domestic economic development programs of EU member states 
that have comparatively lower Gross National Income (GNI), which in
many cases are the same CEEC countries under BRI.16 
Even with the ever-broadening CEEC-China relationship, some Central 
EU institutions expressed reservations about cooperation with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC).17 Specifically noting, “they have displayed
intentions to deal with Beijing in a coherent and unitary manner—thereby 
explicitly leaving a reduced space for developing the 16+1 format as an 
eccentric offshoot of broader EU-China cooperation efforts.”18 
On the legal front, in 2016, the European Commission Joint Communication 
on Elements for a New EU Strategy on China insisted that any bilateral
relations with China—including in-group settings such as the 17+1 
format—should be coordinated with the EU to ensure that relevant aspects 
are “in line with EU law, rules and policies, and that the overall outcome 
is beneficial for the EU as a whole.”19 This policy will be further developed
13. Press Release, European Union External Action, Connecting Europe & Asia
the EU Strategy (Sept. 26, 2019), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-asian_connectivity
_factsheet_september_2019.pdf_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/KEA7-NHCL].
14. Zeneli, supra note 6; Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions 
and the European Investment Bank Connecting Europe and Asia – Building Blocks for an 
EU Strategy, COM (2018) 31 final (Sept. 18, 2018). 
15. The EU-China Connectivity Platform, EUR. COMM’N., https://ec.europa.eu/transport/ 
themes/international/eu-china-connectivity-platform_en [https://perma.cc/4FJ8-JYYY].
16. Cohesion Fund, EUR. COMM’N., https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/
cohesion-fund/ [https://perma.cc/FN2L-NBCH]. 
17. Ciurtin, supra note 4. 
18. [S]ome CEE states that are members of the European Union (and close
partners of the United States) have started to pursue a path of inertial 
participation—or outright disengagement—from the 16+1 format. Poland, the 
Czech Republic (China Brief, February 15), Romania, and the Baltic states are at 
the forefront of this strategic shift, leaving Hungary and the more China-
dependent Balkan states to keep the 16+1 format afloat. 
Id.
19. Hillman & McCalpin, supra note 3; see also Commission Regulation 1219/2012, 
Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements Between 
Member States and Third Countries, 2012 O.J. (L 351), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:351:0040:0046:EN:PDF [https://perma.cc/VC9D-QP2C].
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in a later discussion of the limited legal authority of individual EU
members to enter into trade agreements with countries outside the EU.20 
Perhaps this BRI presence in the EU will facilitate the EU to move closer
to China on trade relations. 
Labor issues can also be a factor in increased Chinese investment in 
Poland and the CEEC. For example, Poland has been experiencing a labor 
exodus and a surge of foreign migrant labor.21 At the same time, the wage 
levels in China and, for example, Poland are not so disparate.22 Chinese 
investors, particularly the large SOEs, frequently bring much of their own 
workforce and managers with them; both factors could allow a positive 
fit.23 
An interesting outcome of EU-CEEC developments on BRI issues 
might be whether these activities of the 17+1 could facilitate a pathway to 
an eventual EU-China FTA which places trade and investment under the 
EU and could diminish the competitive advantages of Poland and the 
CEEC countries. 
This Article is organized as follows: (I) Introduction; (II) BRI Enters EU 
through the CEEC and its Implications, discussing economics, political, 
and labor issues; (III) Legal Aspects, discussing laws under EU’s legal
limitations on EU members to engage in formal trade agreements with
non-EU members; (IV) Analysis of BRI in EU; and (V) Conclusion.
20.  Legal issues are discussed in Part III of this Article. 
21. Makana Eyre & Martin Goillandeau, Poland’s Two-Faced Immigration 
Strategy, POLITICO (June 6, 2019, 1:47 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-two-
faced-immigration-strategy-ukraine-migrants/ [https://perma.cc/92GW-XD8Y]; Ian Francis,
Poland Short of Workers After Exodus to Britain and Germany, SKY NEWS (Apr. 29, 2018, 
6:21 PM), https://news.sky.com/story/poland-short-of-workers-after-exodus-to-britain-
and-germany-11351969 [https://perma.cc/YP2Z-X255]; Dorota Bartyzel, A Country Reliant
on Migrants Frets About Europe’s Virus Exodus, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2020, 9:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-09/a-country-reliant-on-migrants-frets-
about-europe-s-virus-exodus [https://perma.cc/H6ST-7VXG]. 
 22. Kenneth Rapoza, China Wage Levels Equal to or Surpass Parts of Europe, 
FORBES (Aug. 16, 2017, 12:52 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/08/16/ 
china-wage-levels-equal-to-or-surpass-parts-of-europe/#69c6c8f73e7f [https://perma.cc/
W2DB-CG3W].
23. See Nyshka Chandran, China Can Make its Belt and Road Project More Successful 
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II. BRI ENTERS EU THROUGH CEEC’S 17+1
A. BRI in CEEC: 17+1 
1. BRI
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) refers to the combination of the 
Silk Road Economic Belt (six major land corridors across the Eurasian
continent) and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (a network of maritime 
trade routes connecting Asia with Africa and Europe).24 
No official or generally accepted definition of the BRI exists. Its geographical
scope includes 65 countries which jointly account for some 60% of global Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and 30% of the world’s population. . . . China’s stated
objectives for the BRI refer to a broad intention to foster international understanding
and collaboration with the countries involved, which focus on five areas: (i)
policy coordination, (ii) capacity building, (iii) liberalization and facilitation of trade 
and investment, (iv) financial cooperation and (v) people-to-people exchange.25 
24. Infrastructure investment along the six economic corridors of the Belt and Road 
is concerned with covering a large energy- and resource-rich part of the world, as follows:  
1. New Eurasia Land Bridge: involving rail to Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia,
Belarus, and Poland. 2. China, Mongolia, Russia Economic Corridor: including 
rail links and the steppe road—this will link with the land bridge. 3. China, Central 
Asia, West Asia Economic Corridor: linking to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey. 4. China Indochina Peninsula Economic 
Corridor: Viet Nam, Thailand, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Cambodia, Myanmar, 
and Malaysia. 5. China, Pakistan Economic Corridor . . . ; 6. China, Bangladesh, 
India, Myanmar Economic Corridor.  
China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape,
OECD BUS. & FIN. OUTLOOK, at 11 (2018), https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-
and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/89UL- NXB6]. It also has been described as 
[t]he analysis of the BRI shows that it: involves a significant amount of 
communication and branding, with multiple projects labeled as BRI projects
apparently because they fall within its geographical scope; is not subject 
to a clearly-defined development plan, program or budget, and that there is no
clear list of projects that it is intended to include; and has no clear geographical or 
economic boundaries – the BRI appears to have evolved in response to individual
countries’ engagement, with China rather than in line with an overarching strategy.
Steer Davies Gleave et al., Research for TRAN Committee: The New Silk Route – Opportunities 
and Challenges for EU Transport, Policy Dep’t for Structural & Cohesion Policies, at 15 
(Jan. 2018), https://www.europarl. europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/585907/IPOL_
STU(2018)585907_EN.pdf [https:// perma.cc/EFF3-76YE]. 
25.  Gleave et al., supra note 24. 
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The BRI and its financial arrangements drive this international cooperation.
In 2012, China presented a proposal to “governments in Central and
Eastern Europe with a formal offer to boost trade with the region,” and 
China launched its own investment fund.26 The BRI format is that of 17+1 
with each participating country signing BRI cooperation agreements.27 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sometimes referred to as the New Silk
Road, is one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects ever conceived.
Launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the vast collection of development 
and investment initiatives would stretch from East Asia to Europe, significantly 
expanding China’s economic and political influence.28 
SILK ROAD AND MARITIME SILK ROAD29 
26. Humphrey Hawksley, China Paves its Latest Silk Road into Eastern Europe, 
NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Feb. 25, 2016, 7:00 PM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/China-
paves-its-latest-silk-road-into-Eastern-Europe [https://perma.cc/L5AR-4DTL].
27. Ciurtin, supra note 4. 
28. Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-
massive-belt-and-road-initiative [https://perma.cc/AA9F-4AHC].
29. The map is found in, Greece Signs BRI Deals, States “China Invested When 
Everyone Else Stayed Away,”  SILK ROAD BRIEFING (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.silk
roadbriefing.com/news/2019/11/13/greece-signs-bri-deals-states-china-invested-everyone-
8
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2. CEEC 
The CEEC/17+1 framework began in 2012 with China, eleven EU
member states, and five EU candidate countries—all in Central and
Eastern Europe—all of whom signed cooperation agreements with China 
to participate in the BRI.30 When Greece joined in August 2018, the 16+1 
became the “17+1.”31 
Over the years, the CEEC has become increasingly important to China.32 
In fact, the 16+1 framework “was a carefully designed maneuver to build 
a stronger presence of China both in a ‘soft diplomatic’ aspect as well as 
providing a platform for extended economic cooperation.”33 Most of the
CEEC/17+1 countries were part of the former Communist Eastern Bloc 
and are now EU member states with a combined population of 113.1 
million,34 which is 25.3 percent of the EU’s total population.35 Because of 
the CEEC’s location and economic needs, the CEEC/17+1 countries have 
been responsive to BRI overtures from China.36 Of the 17 CEEC members,
else-stayed-away/ [https://perma.cc/7USY-RUUP] (showing the Silk Road: upper road 
Italy to China; Maritime Silk Road: lower road Italy-Indonesia-China). 
30. See China, the 16+1 Format and the EU, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 625.173 (Sept. 
2018); see also Hillman & McCaplin, supra note 3. 
31. Since then, other EU countries, Portugal (Dec. 5, 2018) and Italy (Mar. 23, 
2019) also signed on as members participating in the BRI, though they are not CEE 
countries. Zeneli, supra note 6; see also Eijk & Gunavardana, supra note 6; Chatzky, supra 
note 6. 
 32. Kuo, supra note 7. 
33. Id.
34. The population of the EU is about 445 million. European Countries by 
Population (2020), WORLDMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/population/countries-
in-europe-by-population/ [https://perma.cc/T6US-QKKS]; see also Thomas Ohr, Global 
Startup Awards Releases In-Depth Report about the CEE Startup Ecosystem, EU-
STARTUPS (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.eu-startups.com/2018/11/global-startup-awards-
releases-in-depth-report-about-the-cee-startup-ecosystem/ [https://perma.cc/89H3-GTST].
35. WORLDMETER, supra note 34; see also Eastern Europe Population 2020, 
WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/continents/eastern-europe-
population/ [https://perma.cc/NX8G-JJS5]; Eurostat Press Office, EU Population Up to 
Nearly 513 Million on 1 January 2018,EUROSTAT (July 10, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
documents/2995521/9063738/3-10072018-BP-EN.pdf/ccdfc838-d909-4fd8-b3f9-db0d6 
5ea457f [https://perma.cc/G9DQ-LU7L].
36. It is noticed that Greece, but not Italy, both EU Members and geographical
neighbors, are not defined by OECD as within the CEE, although apparently Greece is 
close enough by China’s calculations to be included in the 17+1.  See Ciurtin, supra note 
4; Evelyn Cheng, China Tackles Worries about Belt and Road Debt as it Notches a Swiss 
Endorsement, CNBC (May 1, 2019, 1:14 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/01/china-
signs-mou-with-finance-giant-switzerland-on-belt-and-road.html [https://perma.cc/JSP3-
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only Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, 
and Serbia are not EU members, though they are in the process of 
transposing (integrating) EU legislation into national law to qualify for
membership.37 
MEMBERS OF THE CEE-CHINA BRI “16+1” FORMAT38 
BC46]; Eijk & Gunayardana, supra note 6; Cooperation Between China and Central and 
Eastern European Countries, WIKIPEDIA (Aug. 16, 2020), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Cooperation_between_China_and_Central_and_Eastern_European_Countries [https:// 
perma.cc/ETW5-H8E4]; Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECS), ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=303 [https://
perma.cc/AJV2-G79J]; CEE countries (CEECs), STAT. NETH. (CBS), https://www.cbs.nl/ 
en-gb/news/2018/31/international-road-haulage-over-4-percent-up-in-2017/cee-countries 
—ceecs— [https://perma.cc/5U72-XLLP].
37. Bosnia and Herzegovina do not yet meet the requirements for EU membership 
but are still considered “potential candidates.” Countries, EUR. UNION (July 28, 2020), 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en [https://perma.cc/87QS-CEYR]. 
38. Hawksley, supra note 26. 
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Also, in the landscape of Central Europe is a discrete group of countries 
known as the Visegrad Group (V4).39 
[The V4] is a loosely knit bloc comprising of four Central European countries
(Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary, and Poland). The group was founded in 1991. . . . 
[It] offer[s] a platform for engaging in discussion not only among the V4
members themselves but also with third countries. . . . Currently, the V4 has 
established a regularized cooperation platform with two East Asian countries:
Japan and South Korea. . . . The V4-China dimension has been so far mostly
neglected by policymakers from the V4 countries and has thus been relegated to
secondary importance when it comes to engaging with China.40 
Arguably, China could work better with the V4 than with the 17+ because
the “17 CEE countries act more like competitors for China’s attention and 
not as partners in promoting their common interests.”41 
B. BRI in CEEC: Economic Expansion
1. Trade and Investment
The World Bank (WBO) lists the CEEC’s GDP as follows, indicating relative 
financial ability to engage in BRI projects with the Chinese.42 
39. About the Visegrad Group, VISEGRAD GRP., http://www.visegrad group.eu/about
[https://perma.cc/8P9U-QJ3A].
 40. Klára Dubravčíková et al., Prospects for Developing the V4+China Cooperation 
Platform, CENT. EUR. INST. OF ASIAN STUD., at 6–8 (2019), https://ceias.eu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2019/10/V4-China-cooperation_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P99-4AC6].
41. Id. at 9. 
42.  EU Members Highest GDP: Poland, Czechia, Romani, Greece, Hungary. Non-
EU: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro. Data GDP 
(Current US$), THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
[https://perma.cc/H94Y-Z4J9]; Emilian Kavalski, China’s “16+1” is Dead? Long live the 
“17+1”, DIPLOMAT (Mar. 29, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-161-is-
dead-long-live-the-171/ [https://perma.cc/PTZ7-CG6R]. 
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Albania 2019 15,278.08 3 
Bosnia and 2019 20,047.85 2 
Herzeeovina 
Bulgaria 2019 67,927.18 7 
Croatia 2019 60,415.55 8 
Czechia 2019 246,489.25 3 
Estonia 2019 31,386.95 12 
Greece 2019 209,852.76 4 
Hungary 2019 160,967.16 5 
Latvia 2019 34,117.20 11 
Lithuania 2019 54,219.32 90 
Montenegro 2019 5,494.74 5 
North 2019 12,694.82 4 
Macedonia 
Poland 2019 592,164.40 1 
Romania 2019 250,077.44 2 
Serbia 2019 51,409.17 1 
Slovakia 2019 105,422.30 6 
I 2019 53,742.16 10 
2019 14,342,902.84 
WORLD BANK - GDP (CURRENT US$)43  
[EU MEMBERS DARK COLOR; NON-EU MEMBERS LIGHT] 
a. Trade
According to Chinese sources, “since the China-CEEC platform was
launched in 2012, trade between [these countries] has increased more than 
50 percent. The volume reached 82.23 billion U.S. dollars last year [2018],
up 21 percent year on year, with Chinese imports from the 16 CEEC rising
faster than its exports.”44 
43. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 42. 
44. Commentary: China-CEEC Cooperation Booster for European Integration, 
XINHUA (Apr. 12, 2019, 2:53 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/12/c_ 
137971608.htm [https://perma.cc/B6EZ-LWDM]. “Bilateral trade reached $82.23 billion 








































.•. China trade 
u: with the world with CEECl 6 I ,ports Exports 
16 2012 - 3010 40.3 I I 
2011 - 3640 57.3 I I 
12 
4 0 '° 
0 
PL CZ HU RO SK RS SI BG LT HR EE BA LV MK AL ME 
[V
O




















































 totaled $59.19 billion last year, w
hile im
ports reached $23.04




























































































Import Export Total Trade I 
2018 2014-2018 2018 2014-2018 2018 2014-2018 1 
US$Mn Growth % US$Mn Growth % US$ Mn Growth % 
Total 23,585 40% 65,689 37% 89,274 38% 
Poland 3,642 24% 20,880 46% 24,521 43% 
Czech Republic 4,396 47% 11,900 49% 16,296 48% 
Hungary 4,339 33% 6,541 13% 10,880 21% 
Slovakia 5,245 55% 2,533 -10% 7,778 25% 
Greece 562 62% 6,510 56% 7,072 56% 
Romania 2,166 42% 4,507 40% 6,673 40% 
Slovenia 591 78% 4,436 123% 5,027 116% 
Bulgaria 1,146 16% 1,439 22% 2,586 19% 
Lilhuania 330 110% 1,761 6% 2,091 15% 
Croalia 212 110% 1,328 29% 1,540 36% 
Lalvia 213 45% 1,162 -12% 1,375 -6% 
Eslonia 245 9% 1,030 -10% 1,275 -7% 
Serbia 224 98% 728 71% 951 77% 
Albania 108 -43% 541 43% 649 14% 
Montenegro 42 -23% 178 13% 220 4% 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 77 122% 110 -61% 187 -41% 
North Macedonia [1] 48 -46% 106 38% 154 -8% 
Source: China Customs, IHS Markit. 
T
he follow
ing table outlines trade betw
een C
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In promoting BRI with the CEECs, China acknowledges there is a trade 
imbalance, but argues it provides impetus “for a new development model 
featuring enhanced connectivity with greater investment in infrastructure, 
such as railroads, highways, tunnels, bridges, power plants, electric grids, 
industrial and logistic parks, seaports and airports.”48 
b. Investment 
China and the CEEC have also seen growing mutual investment. According 
to reports, “CEEC investment in  China [in 2018] ha[d] surpassed 1.5
billion dollars, and Chinese investment in the region ha[d] exceeded 10
billion dollars.”49 
From a Chinese perspective, “the 16+1 format has not only been well-
received by member countries but is increasingly used as a leeway to allow
cash-strapped CEECs to sidestep possible violations of EU restrictions on 
sovereign debt levels.”50 From the Chinese perspective, it is a “win-win”
situation. 
Strengthening Sino-CEEC co-operation and connectivity is also conducive to the
successful implementation of the BRI, which aims to facilitate and promote greater
integration among the 60-plus countries along the Belt and Road. CEECs,
providing a strategic link between Asia and West Europe, are vital to the
success of the BRIFalse China’s outbound direct investment (ODI) in CEECs has
been flourishing, while bilateral trade has also blossomed. In the five years ending
2014, China’s ODI to CEECs grew by nearly 100% from US$853 million to US 
$1.7 billion. Among the 16 CEECs, three countries – namely Hungary, Poland
48. Id.; Belt and Road Opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe, CHINA GO 
ABROAD, http://www.chinagoabroad.com/en/article/21526 [https://perma.cc/6RX7-PUK7].
“Central and Eastern European countries have become increasingly dissatisfied with the 
economic results of their ‘17+1’ initiative with China, according to a report released
on Tuesday [April 7, 2020].” This report, titled “‘Empty Shell No More’, . . . called for a 
unified approach to derive greater economic benefit from the relationship with Beijing.” 
The Report, by ten China scholars, each from different Central and Eastern European
nations, found that “as of 2018, the 17 countries’ total deficit with China stood at US $75
billion” and it “advocated ways for their countries to band together before future summits, 
such as ‘17+0’ meetings without Beijing at the table to develop agreement on unified
demands.” Keegan Elmer, Europe’s ‘17+1’ Countries Dissatisfied with China Relations, 
Report Says, as Summit is Postponed, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 7, 2020, 7:38
PM), https://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/diplomacy/article/3078830/europes-171-
countries-dissatisfied-china-relations-report-says [https://perma.cc/69X5-LWU5].
49. Commentary: China-CEEC Cooperation Booster for European Integration, 
supra note 44. 
50. CHINA GO ABROAD, supra note 48. 
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I 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014,2018 
US$Mn US$Mn US$Mn US$Mn US$Mn Growth% 
Total 1,817 2,096 1,715 2,033 2,513 38% 
Poland 329 352 321 406 524 59% 
Hungary 556 571 314 328 321 -42% 
Romania 191 365 392 310 305 59% 
Czech Republic 243 224 228 165 279 15% 
Serbia 30 50 83 170 271 814% 
Greece 121 120 48 182 243 101% 
Bulgaria 170 236 166 251 171 0% 
Slovakia 128 128 83 84 99 -22% 
Croalia 12 12 12 39 69 482% 
Montenegro I I 4 40 63 19,544% 
Eslonia 4 4 4 4 57 1,524% 
Slovenia 5 5 27 27 40 702% 
North Macedonia [ 1] 2 2 2 2 36 1,620% 
Lithuania 13 13 15 17 13 3% 
Latvia 1 1 1 1 12 2,067% 
Albania 7 7 7 5 6 -9% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6 8 9 4 4 -29% 
Source: 2018 Slalislical Bullelin of China's Oulward Foreign Direct lnveslmenl. 
• = less lhan US$1 million 
and the Czech Republic – accounted for more than two-thirds of the total, followed 
by Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, which together accounted for another 30%.51  
Among the 17 CEECs, Poland, Hungary, and Romania accounted for 
46% of mainland China’s outward FDI to CEECs in 2018, but Chinese 
investors are also adding investments in Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro, 
as seen in the below chart.52 
MAINLAND CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI (STOCK) IN 17 CEECS53 
51. Id.; China, CEEC See Steady Trade Growth, supra note 44. 
52. Lam, supra note 46. 
53. Id.
16
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Some reports show uneven trade in CEECs. For example, CEE-China 
trade rose by 86 percent from 2009 to 2014 and hit its 2012 target of $100 
billion by 2015,54 yet “just five out of the sixteen countries—Poland, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania—received 80 percent of these 
trade exchanges.”55 Similarly, Chinese investment in the region rose from
$400 million in 2009 to $1.7 billion in 2014, but just six countries (Bulgaria 
being the fifth) received 95 percent of the total in 2014.56 
While China’s BRI investments in the CEEC continue, different political
perspectives that exist within the CEEC create some changes in the amount 
and types of Chinese investment.57 Furthermore, “China’s efforts to make 
inroads in eastern Europe are being hindered by what nations see as failed 
promises on money materializing and the strings attached to investments.”58 
In Poland, political considerations have deterred some investments. 
Poland is open to investment from China, . . . even as relations have faltered
between the two countries over the role of Chinese technology firms in 5G and
state infrastructure projects. A Chinese former Huawei executive was arrested in
Poland in January on spying allegations. . . . Polish President Andrzej Duda told 
Reuters last month that he was opposed to investment by Beijing in strategic 
infrastructure, including seaports and airports. Nonetheless, the minister said he
welcomed investment. “We are also open to Chinese investments, especially
greenfields, in the manufacturing and innovative sectors . . . .”59 
54.  China was clearly a latecomer to the CEE region and is currently trying
to build connections and learn the business environment of this [region] 
saturated predominantly by European and U.S. market players. Chinese efforts 
in the region already started to bear first fruit with trade and investment 
increasing year by year from $43.9 billion in 2010 to $58.7 billion in 2016. The 
main areas of the investment were infrastructure, machinery, chemical, telecom, 
and new energy projects. In the coming years the CEE region will gain even 
more significance as the Belt and Road Initiative – a massive Chinese state project 
– sees it as a crucial hub for its land and sea routes towards western Europe. 
Kuo, supra note 7. 
 55. Angela Stanzel, China’s Investment In Influence: The Future of 16+1 Cooperation, 
Eur. Council on Foreign Rels., at 6, 8–9 (Dec. 2016), https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_ 
Analysis_Sixteen_Plus_One.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ72-XWRC].
56. Id.
 57. See Alan Crawford & Peter Martin, China is Forced to Reconsider its Route 




 59. Joanna Plucinska, Poland Open to Investment from China: Foreign Minister, 
REUTERS (July 8, 2019, 3:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-china/poland-
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Examples of BRI-funded programs in selected CEECs include: 
Poland, with its well-developed industrial market and logistical importance (it is 
estimated that 25% of all road transport in Europe is operated by Polish 
companies) has not only established a strategic partnership with China but is also
a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – the only
CEEC joining the bank so far.60 
Other examples include Hungary, which will build a high-speed rail line 
between Budapest, its capital, and Belgrade, the capital of Serbia in an 85 
percent Chinese-financed project, which “will shorten the travel time 
between the two capitals from eight hours to three.”61 
In Serbia, China’s landmark BRI projects include the “‘Mihailo Pupin’ 
Bridge on the Danube River in Belgrade, the construction of sections of 
the Corridor 11 highway, and the expansion of coal mines near the 
‘Kostolac’ thermal power plant.”62 
Furthermore, the “extension of the Budapest-Belgrade high-speed rail 
line to Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, and to Athens, the capital of 
Greece, will give China-bound freight trains another alternative to gain 
access to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas.”63 China’s “state-owned 
shipping giant, Cosco, has recently acquired a majority stake in the Piraeus 
Port Authority,” which as the closest port in the Northern Mediterranean 
to the Suez Canal, Piraeus is a strategic trans-shipment hub for Asian 
exports to Europe.64 China’s exports “could reach Germany, for example,
seven to [eleven] days earlier thanks to the abovementioned high-speed 
rail connection.”65  
By comparison, on April 2, 2019, the EU announced its adoption of an 
investment package valued at €8 billion under its Cohesion Fund.66 The
open-to-investment-from-china-foreign-minister-idUSKCN1U31LR [https://perma.cc/
Z52R-3WNT].






66. European Commission Press Release IP/19/1872, Commission Adopts €4
Billion Investment Package for Infrastructure Projects Across 10 Member States (Apr. 2, 
2019).
Cohesion policy is the European Union’s strategy to promote and support the
“overall harmonious development” of its Member States and regions. Enshrined 
in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Art. 174), the EU’s
cohesion policy aims to strengthen economic and social cohesion by reducing
disparities in the level of development between regions. The policy focuses on 
key areas which will help the EU face up to the challenges of the 21st century
and remain globally competitive. Approximately 32.5 % of the EU budget 2014-
2020 (equivalent to ca. EUR 351.8 billion over seven years at 2014 prices) is
18
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investment package is for infrastructure projects that involve Bulgaria, 
Czechia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal and
Romania.67 The infrastructure projects cover “health, transport, research, 
environment and energy.”68 With national co-financing, the initial investment
of €4 billion resulted in a total investment of €8 billion across ten member 
states.69 Projects in CEEC include: smoother road and rail connections on
the Trans-European Transport Network in Czechia; efficient public services 
in Greece and affordable energy in Crete; improved connectivity, reduced 
congestion and increased transport safety around Budapest, Hungary; and 
better healthcare and greater connectivity in Poland.70 
2. Poland as an Illustration 
a. Economics 
Poland, as one of the big markets of BRI investment and trade, provides
a useful illustration of how BRI affects it, having some common characteristics
with other CEE countries; though Poland does have an advantageous 
geostrategic location as well as economic potential.71 Chinese reports
indicate, “Poland is among the top-ranking CEE countries . . . as an attractive 
prospective investment destination.”72 Poland is situated in Central Europe,
allocated to financial instruments which support cohesion policy. These are
managed and delivered in partnership between the European Commission, the 
Member States and stakeholders at the local and regional level. The Cohesion
Fund is aimed at Member States whose Gross National Income (GNI) per
inhabitant is less than 90% of the EU average. It aims to reduce economic and
social disparities and to promote sustainable development.  
Cohesion Policy, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/what/glossary/ 
c/cohesion-policy [https://perma.cc/6EVS-GAYF]. 
67.  European Commission Press Release IP/19/1872, supra note 66. 
68. Id.
 69. Id.; Priorities for 2014-2020, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/ 
en/policy/how/priorities [https://perma.cc/C3BC-FT3J].
70. Priorities for 2014-2020, supra note 69. 
71. Kuo, supra note 7. 
72.  Lukasz Sarek, Chinese FDI in Poland: Still Just Wishful Thinking, SINOPSIS 
(Aug. 25, 2018), https://sinopsis.cz/en/chinese-fdi-in-poland-still-just-wishful-thinking/
[https://perma.cc/JQH9-YUUB].
Officially, Chinese direct investment in Poland has grown over the last two or
three years. But the figures are not so impressive: according to the National Bank 
of Poland (NBP), in 2016 the total Chinese direct investment reached EUR 123.3 
million, while in 2015 it was EUR 198.5 million. Admittedly, experts disagree 
on the methodology: how to calculate Chinese investment in Poland? The NBP
 19








   
   
 




















   
 
borders seven countries, and is considered “a portal linking European
Union markets.”73 
In 2015, Poland signed a memorandum of understanding with China for 
the BRI, which Poland expects to support economic cooperation with 
China.74 In 2018, “Sino-Polish trade grew by 13.3 percent to reach $33.47 
billion.”75 Further, “Polish exports to China amounted to $2.5 billion, up
8.7 percent while imports from China grew 13.7 percent to reach $30.97 billion, 
maintaining the country’s position as Poland’s second-largest source 
of imports.”76 However, some Chinese investors remain unconvinced and 
claim that “the future does not look so rosy anymore” as Poland is no longer 
the “biggest recipient of Chinese investment of the Visegrad Group countries 
and the eighth biggest in the EU.”77  By way of explanation, it is noted that:
Poland has to step up and show that it is not only a transit country . . . but that it
can be the important node connecting north to south and east to west. . . . “There
is not much value in just being a corridor,” . . . [t]he real value is in becoming an
intelligent and well-connected node in the flow. The CEE’s prosperity could be
significantly accelerated with better north-south connectivity. There is no reason
why trains couldn’t stop in Poland first. . . . [I]t’s all about “infrastructure, infrastructure,
infrastructure. We see bottlenecks at the eastern border of Poland. We see that the
railway network is not yet developed to the stage where seamless flows of cargo
by rail are possible.78 
methodology does not include investments by companies registered outside the 
People’s Republic of China – in Europe or elsewhere. For this reason, the 
Rhodium Group – an independent research provider, for example, reports that
about EUR 936 million was invested in Poland in 2016. 
Belt, Road, and Humbug. China’s Investments in Poland, VSQUARE (Nov. 11, 2018),
https://vsquare.org/belt-road-hub-and-humbug-what-are-chinas-investments-in-poland/ 
[https://perma.cc/5TP5-72QL] [hereinafter Belt, Road, and Humbug].
73. Chen, supra note 10. 
74. Id. (“One positive outcome of the BRI is that more China-Europe freight trains, 
also known as the China Railway Express, pass through Poland to reach other European 
countries, and this has significantly improved the efficiency of cross-border trade. Large
ships are regularly loaded in the two major Polish ports of Gdansk and Gdynia, which 
account for 95 percent of maritime cargo transportation in the country, with up to 21,000 
standard containers for transport to Asia, including Chinese ports in Shanghai, Qingdao, 
Ningbo and Shenzhen every week. . . . The trade between China and Europe is backed by 
a network with Poland functioning as a transportation hub.”); see also Yang Yi, China, 
Poland Vows to Strengthen Bilateral Cooperation, XINHUA (July 9, 2019, 10:54 AM), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/09/c_138211378.htm [https://perma.cc/KT3F-




 77. Belt, Road, and Humbug, supra note 72; see also Chen, supra note 10. 
78.  Frank Schuhholz & Wolfgang Lehmacher, Poland & CEE: The Buckle on the 
Belt & Road?, BELT & ROAD NEWS (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.beltandroad.news/ 
2019/03/20/poland-cee-the-buckle-on-the-belt-road/ [https://perma.cc/E5Q2-94XQ] (“At 
20
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Advocates for expanding BRI in Poland argue “BRI can play a vital role 
in Poland’s future [and] the region’s development.”79 
For instance, the government in Warsaw is currently in talks with the Chinese to
get them to finance the new Central Airport for Poland, which will also be a huge
logistics center with train lines and cargo facilities. Note that EU does not subsidize 
building new airports. However, the current EU, dominated by a Franco-German
alliance, is not seeing the move as [beneficial], because it leads a way for the CEE 
to export more goods and services to China, which will threaten the current status
quo of these aforementioned countries as leaders of EU-China cooperation.80 
Also assisting Poland’s development is EU’s Cohesion Fund of €8 billion 
provided across ten member states; it has allotted monies for projects in 
Poland for better healthcare, maritime transports, the Szczecin Metropolitan 
Railway; and, construction of a section of the S7 express road linking
Warsaw to Grójec.81 
b. Labor Issues: Emigration, Immigration, and Chinese Workers 
Wage levels throughout much of the CEEC remained low after their
return to the West and are comparative with wage levels in some of China’s
larger cities, thus inviting Chinese investment. It is reported that using
three Chinese cities as a gauge, 
their employees’ median salaries are higher than those in the poorest section of
Europe: the old Communist Balkans. Just across from the Adriatic Sea on rich
Italy’s border sits a Chinese-like labor pool. Only they come cheaper, in fact. 
Chinese workers in Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Beijing, on average, earn more than
workers in Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and new NATO member 
Montenegro, which has a median income of just $896 a month. Shanghai median
wages are not all that much different than Poland’s at $1,569. The same goes for 
the Czech Republic, with its median salary in Prague, its richest city, sitting 
around $1,400. Hungary’s gross average wage is right in Shanghai’s wheelhouse, 
the moment, the cargo is stuck at the various border points because of customs issues,
change of gauges and the lack of high-performing, efficient terminal infrastructure. And 
on top of that there are still missing sufficient north-south connections. . . . Up to 90% of
current cargo flows traveling by rail between China and Europe and vice versa go through
Poland, so other EU and CEE countries see the country as a competitor to their own ambitious 
plans and go directly to China to show themselves as the future hub for the Chinese.
Poland, [it is pointed out] . . . is roughly 1000 km closer than Duisburg to China and should 
be the more obvious choice to be a logistics hub supporting distribution and supply
concepts.”).
79. Kuo, supra note 7. 
80. Id.
81.  European Commission Press Release IP/19/1872, supra note 66. 
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at $1,139 per month. China’s wage growth is impressive. Great for the Chinese.
But it has capped wage growth in many of the lower income states within 
Europe.82 
These low wage levels helped propel the CEEC and Polish workers to
emigrate within the EU in their quest for better jobs and pay.83 The gap
created by workers leaving is largely filled by hiring migrant workers, in 
the case of Poland, mostly Ukrainians.84 
[A] report by PwC estimates the shortfall to reach 1.5 million workers by 2025. 
Other booming Central European economies are also feeling the dearth of 
workers, as populations shrink due to tumbling birth rates and high emigration. 
Unemployment is below 4 percent in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
and at 5.4 percent in Slovakia, according to Eurostat.85 
The chart below illustrates the growing number of emigrants from 
Poland.86 
82. Rapoza, supra note 22; see also Ronald C. Brown, China-Eu BIT and FTA: 
Building a Bridge on the Silk Road Not Detoured by Labor Standard Provisions, 29 WASH. 
INT’L L. J. 61, 74–79 (2019) (discussing wage levels and labor conditions in EU and 
China).
83. See Rapoza, supra note 22. 
84. Maria Wilczek, Poland Struggles to Find Workers as Unemployment Hits 28-
Year Low, ALJAZEERA (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/poland-
struggles-find-workers-unemployment-hits-28-year-190829195115010.html [https://perma.cc/
E4TG-K56T].
[M]any Ukrainians are now looking to move to Germany in search of higher 
wages after Berlin passed legislation giving skilled workers from outside the EU 
access to its labour markets. In response, Polish employers cast their net wider,
turning to Asia in search of staff, mainly to work in meat factories and steel
mills. Because of recent trends of anti-immigration, the government has not
made it easy for companies seeking Asian workers; rather, preference and easier
entrance procedures seem to be available only to workers from Russia, Belarus,
Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova.  
Monika Pronczuk & Evon Huber, Poland’s Immigrant Stance at Odds with Need for 
Workers, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/2dd225a8-a498-11e9-
974c-ad1c6ab5efd1 [https://perma.cc/G4JD-3LRK].
Poland is the world’s most popular destination for temporary labour migrants for 
the second year running, according to a new report released by the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Published this week, the 
report found that in 2017 1.1 million temporary migrants moved to Poland, putting 
it ahead of the United States, which received 691,000 workers, and Germany 
with just over 400,000.  
Matt Day, Increasing Numbers of Workers Heading to Poland as New Report Shows 




85. Wilczek, supra note 84. 
86.  Pronczuk & Huber, supra note 84. 
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GROWING LABOUR SHORTAGES IN POLAND87 
The number of Chinese workers coming to Poland has increased, ranking 
second after Ukraine, and are working in Chinese state-owned companies 
and in private companies, mainly engaging in trade.88 
“A common lament of recipient nations is that despite all the investments from
huge infrastructure projects, there’s a lack of local employment opportunities” . . . . 
One of the biggest complaints around the [BRI] is an excessive reliance on 
Chinese employees for on-the-ground projects, which deprives participating
countries of jobs. . . . Beijing basically replicated its traditional state-owned
enterprises (SOE) model in other developing nations . . . . These enterprises “tend
to air drop the entire ecosystem, from their engineers to the construction workers
to the chefs, into the countries to do the project. . . .”89 
It has also been noted that: 
87. Id.
88.  For Chinese population in Poland, see generally Feng Ping, Chinese Migration 
in Poland, 4 POLISH J. OF POL. SCI. 161, 178 (2018). 
89. Chandran, supra note 23. 
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[E]xcessive reliance on Chinese labor reduces the projects’ benefits to host
countries and generates social tensions and other problems. Chinese developers
point to plausible problems with the local labor pool, such as a lack of qualified
candidates, a project’s distance from urban areas, or an unsuitable local work
ethic, as the rationale for using Chinese labor. Nevertheless, the shortage 
of opportunities for local labor and other benefits to the local economy results in
dissatisfaction and resentment, as do the enclaves of Chinese workers, which
contribute to social problems.90 
It is reported that both local and Chinese workers may be mistreated or 
exploited by developers or their subcontractors.91 
C. Political Winds: Same Bed, Different Dreams 17+1 Dividing EU?92 
China values its “geostrategic position as a bridgehead to the EU market 
and a crucial transit corridor for its Belt and Road initiative (BRI).”93 
While the EU remains skeptical of China, believing it aims to divide the 
EU, China does not force participation in the plan.94 Rather, the 17+1 members
may consider joining because BRI presents a “useful mechanism in their 
[search] for complementary economic opportunities—not to replace the 
ones provided by the EU.”95 Additionally, it is argued, it “constitutes an 
important part of Europe-China relationship and complements the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the EU-China 2020 Strategic 
90. Daniel R. Russel & Blake Berger, Navigating the Belt and Road Initiative, ASIA 
SOC’Y POL’Y INST. 15 (June 2019), https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/
Navigating%20the%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3KF-
JEXK].
91. Id. at 16 (“Problems include unpaid wages, confiscated passports, unsafe work
conditions, and forced labor. Dispute resolution and grievance mechanisms tend to be 
unclear if they exist at all, and compensation is often delayed. It is often difficult for either 
local or Chinese workers to complain about these abuses, let alone obtain remediation. The 
lack of skilled local candidates is particularly acute for higher-level management or 
technical positions.”). For other instances of labor law violations, see generally Myroslava 
Keryk, Working in Poland: Violations of the Labour Rights of Ukrainian Migrants in the 
Construction and Services Sectors, NASZWYBÓR [OUR CHOICE FOUND.] (2018), https:// 
pl.naszwybir.pl/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/03/raport-online-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WFP3-2CNA]. 
92. The question remains whether EU members will dream of more connections
with China, even though they lie in same “political bed” and thus could divide the EU. See 
Hillman & McCalpin, supra note 3 (explaining connections between the EU and China 
under the 16+1 framework). 
93. China, the 16+1 Format and the EU, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 625.173 (Sept. 2018). 
94. Press Release, China-CEE Institute, Greece External Relations Briefing: Dubrovnik
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Agenda for Cooperation.”96 It is also argued that “Chinese investments in 
infrastructure and energy projects will significantly ease the EU’s financial 
involvement and spending needs, especially with a shrinking budget after 
Brexit. . . . Chinese capital will improve the infrastructure needed to 
enhance the integration and economic development of CEEC. It’s a win-
win situation.”97 Another explanation for the EU’s reticence to support
BRI is that “the current EU, dominated by a Franco-German alliance, is 
not seeing the move as beneficial, because it leads a way for the CEE to 
export more goods and services to China, which will threaten the current 
status quo of these aforementioned countries as leaders of EU-China 
cooperation.”98 
Europe’s initial openness for BRI has lessened not only due to intra-
competitive EU battles, but also due to concern that BRI may be dividing 
the EU.99 
In the eyes of a growing number of critical observers, BRI is not only
undermining the EU’s internal cohesion, but it is also creating tough competition
for European companies in terms of trade, investment and market access in
Europe and Asia. . . . [T]he EU has begun to take a more alert attitude toward China’s 
rise. In March 2019, the EU issued a landmark communication stating that Beijing is
a systemic rival in some areas, as well as a competitor and potential partner in
others. This change in attitude has affected Europe’s response to BRI, which has
turned more ambivalent.100 
From 2018 to 2019, not all CEEC relationships with China charged ahead
under the BRI. 
[S]ome CEE states that are members of the EU (and close partners of the United
States) have started to pursue a path of inertial participation—or outright disengagement 
—from the 16+1 format. Poland, the Czech Republic, . . . Romania, and the Baltic 
states are at the forefront of this strategic shift, leaving Hungary and the more
China-dependent Balkan states to keep the 16+1 format afloat.101 
96. Id.; see also EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, E.U. EXTERNAL 
ACTION (Nov. 23, 2020), http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/eu-china_2020_ 
strategic_agenda_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX6D-32CJ].
97. Kuo, supra note 7. 
98. Id.
 99. Gustaaf Geeraerts, Europe and China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Growing Concerns, 
More Strategy, 118 EGMONT INST. 2 (Nov. 2019), http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/ 
uploads/2019/11/SPB118.pdf?type=pdf [https://perma.cc/637U-ANY3]. 
100. Id.
 101. Ciurtin, supra note 4. It is argued, the “Belt and Road constitutes a marginal
increase in infrastructure development and improves Chinese access to supplies and markets, 
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This might partially explain China’s recent decision to allow Greece to 
join the 16+1.102  Furthermore: 
Chinese investors already own the majority stake in Piraeus Port [in Greece], one 
of Europe’s largest, while the country is strategically positioned as both a maritime
and road and rail location for goods travelling through to other parts of the EU. 
Piraeus acts as the distribution hub for a massive network of ports, railways, roads
and industrial parks spanning Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe that will
see trillions invested in new infrastructure across 126 countries.103 
The EU remains grounded in its position to not join or consider joining 
China’s BRI.104 EU officials explain, “The bloc decided not to become 
a member when the massive plan was presented more than five years ago. 
Member states are free to join individually, as nearly half of them have 
already done, but the same official added that all member states are bound 
by EU rules and European legislation.”105 
In efforts to improve relations between EU and China, together they
have created the EU-China Connectivity Platform.106 It is argued that:
[T]he EU remains very much interested in engaging with and participating in
BRI, hoping to shape the initiative, including through the EU-China Connectivity 
Platform. This platform offers a concrete possibility to engage in mutually beneficial 
projects of infrastructure construction, which would not only open up new ground
for EU–China cooperation but also offer the opportunity for the two to join forces
to promote stability and development in the vast Eurasian continent in between
them. . . . The strategy’s emphasis is on sustainable, comprehensive, and rules-
based connectivity. Investments should respect labor rights, avoid political and
financial dependencies, and guarantee a level playing field for businesses. The 
but the real action in infrastructure these days flows from private finance, not Chinese 
projects.” Richard Boucher, China’s Belt and Road: A Reality Check, DIPLOMAT (Mar. 29, 
2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-belt-and-road-a-reality-check/ [https://perma.cc/
XDR9-ZXSS]. 
102. For its part, China’s motives for integrating Greece into its CEE “roadshow”
have symbolic and political underpinnings. The dwindling functionality of 16+1 
and the increasing reluctance of some key members (such as Poland, Romania 
and the Czech Republic) to fully commit to the initiative required the introduction of 
a new element to dispel the diplomatic inertia. This made Greece the perfect 
candidate for membership: although it had waited on the sidelines since the Sofia 
summit of 2018, it was welcomed aboard at Dubrovnik, allowing China to capitalize 
on the alleged attractiveness of the platform and its rediscovered dynamism.  
Ciurtin, supra note 4. 
103. SILK ROAD BRIEFING, supra note 29. 
104. Jorge Valero, European Bloc Not Considering Joining China’s Belt and Road 
Plans, EURACTIV (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-china/news/european-
bloc-not-considering-joining-chinas-belt-and-road-plans/ [https://perma.cc/6QAF-NQPE].
105. Id.
 106. The EU-China Connectivity Platform, supra note 15. 
26
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strategy offers Asian and European states an alternative for BRI and indicates
how the EU wishes to engage with them and what they can expect.107 
As a reaction to the BRI, this new EU connectivity strategy reveals concerns 
that, perhaps, more connectivity with China means less connection and 
more division within the EU.108 In order to act prudently, the EU proceeds
open-armed, yet open-eyed. This new EU connectivity strategy is an “effort 
[that] comes on top of a separate push to adopt more stringent EU investment- 
screening legislation that would impose restrictions on Chinese investments 
in certain critical sectors.”109 
The EU’s position on the BRI is also based on engagement with China rather than
an attempt to isolate it. From the European perspective, the BRI has the potential
to be hugely positive as long as it adheres to EU market rules as well as to
international requirements and standards, and also complements EU policies and
projects. . . . While the EU wants to distinguish its approach on connectivity from 
the BRI’s philosophy, it has also been careful to highlight possible synergies and
107. Geeraerts, supra note 99. The Connectivity Program is further defined as: 
The European Union (EU) and the People’s Republic of China (China) are 
committed to maintaining and developing strong and fruitful relations in the area 
of transport. In an effort to improve transport connectivity, the European Commission 
(DG MOVE) and the National Development and Reform Commission of China 
(NDRC) established a Connectivity Platform in 2015. The main objective of the 
Platform – as agreed by both sides – is to explore opportunities for further cooperation 
in the area of transport with a view to enhance synergies between the EU’s approach 
to connectivity, including the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), and 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The platform is also used to work towards 
greater transparency, reciprocity in market access and a level playing field for 
businesses in the area of transport infrastructure development.  
The EU-China Connectivity Platform, supra note 15. 
108. Erik Brattberg & Etienne Soula, Europe’s Emerging Approach to China’s
Belt and Road Initiative, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/19/europe-s-emerging-approach-to-china-s-belt-
and-road-initiative-pub-77536 [https://perma.cc/USB2-U6CT].
The CEEC is a loose grouping of 12 EU countries and five candidate members. 
What unites them is the fact that they are poorer than Western Europe and in
need of foreign investments. China is helping fill the investment vacuum in CEE 
countries but the EU authorities and the US worry that these countries will
become beholden to Beijing and undermine a common posture against China.
Manoj Joshi, China and Europe: Trade, Technology and Competition, 194 OBSERVER RES.
FOUND. 12 (May 22, 2019). 
109.  Brattberg & Soula, supra note 108. 
 27
BROWNPGS-PIC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2021 10:00 AM    
 
 













   
 
   
complementarity. The official reaction from China to the EU’s new initiative has 
also been mostly positive.110  
As the EU proceeds to be receptive to Chinese financing in the EU, at
the same time it reaches out to many of the CEE countries to provide the 
possibility of additional financing.111 
In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the European Union is
strengthening its economic, social and territorial cohesion. In particular, the EU 
aims at reducing disparities between the levels of development of its various
regions. Among the regions concerned, special attention is paid to rural areas,
areas affected by industrial transition, and regions which suffer from severe and
permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as the northernmost regions
with very low population density and island, cross-border and mountain regions.112 
Additionally, the EU created a Cohesion Fund for member states with the 
expressed goal to “reduce economic and social disparities, and to promote 
sustainable development” and113 Between 2014-2020, this Cohesion Fund 
affects “Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia.”114 The projects covered under this fund include “health,
110. Id. (“For instance, the European Fund for Strategic Investments is seeking to 
invest €500 billion in projects by 2020 while the European External Action Service 
is expected to guarantee €60 billion toward investments in connectivity over 2021–2027 
with the expectation that this will help mobilize additional funding from multilateral 
development banks and the private financial institutions. Ultimately, the proposed EU 
budget will need to be approved by the European Council and the European Parliament.  
Regardless, whatever amount the EU will ultimately allocate will fall way short of the €1.3 
trillion a year it estimates is needed for infrastructure investment in Asia.”); Geeraerts, 
supra note 99. “EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-
President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini and EU Commissioner for 
Transport Violeta Bulc presented the EU’s vision for a new and comprehensive strategy 
to improve connectivity between Europe and Asia.” The European Way to Connectivity – 




111. See Brattberg & Soula, supra note 108. 
112.  Marek Kolodziejski, Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion, at 1 (Aug. 2020), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_3.1.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3C6-H25Q]. 
113. Cohesion Fund, supra note 16. 
114. The Cohesion Fund allocates a total of € 63.4 billion to activities under 
the following categories: trans-European transport networks, notably priority 
projects of European interest as identified by the EU. The Cohesion Fund will 
support infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility; environment: 
here, the Cohesion Fund can also support projects related to energy or transport, 
as long as they clearly benefit the environment in terms of energy efficiency, use 
of renewable energy, developing rail transport, supporting intermodality, strengthening 
public transport, etc.  
28
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transport, research, environment and energy” topics amounting to a total
investment of €8 billion with national co-financing.115 The fund covers ten
member states and allotted monies for projects in Poland, such as maritime 
transports or rail and road transport, that are dedicated to bettering healthcare 
and increasing connectivity.116 
While “the emergence of the 17+1 will have direct bearing on China-
CEE cooperation,” the optimistic view of the apparent competition between 
the EU and China to support financing infrastructural projects in CEEC 
may logically lead to closer relations and increased trade and investment, 
rather than division of EU.117 Another consideration is that “the development
of a 17+1 initiative demonstrates that China has already become a fully-
fledged European power. The growing number of Chinese investments and 
relationships in the continent suggests a much broader and more complex 
Id.; see also 30 Priority Projects, INNOVATION AND NETWORKS EXEC. AGENCY (Sept. 11, 
2020), https://ec.europa.eu/inea/ten-t/ten-t-projects/projects-by-priority-project [https://perma.cc/
9AGS-9X23] (listing the priority projects of European interest as identified by the EU).
115.  European Commission Press Release IP/19/1872, supra note 66. 
116.  In the field of healthcare, almost €61 million of EU funds will help purchase
new equipment for the University Hospital of Kraków, Małopolskie, benefitting 
over 3.3 million inhabitants. Then, €56 million will help build a new hospital 
complex for the Regional Centre of Children Health in Poznań, Wielkopolskie,
centralising healthcare services, extending facilities and buying new equipment. 
The Centre will be equipped with an emergency care department for children 
and will enlarge its orthopedics, traumatology and rehabilitation departments. 
Then, in the field of maritime transports, €155 million will increase the safety 
of operations in the Port of Gdańsk, Pomorskie, with upgraded breakwater 
structures. Almost €65 million will help build or modernise quays and hydro-
technical engineering structures in the Port of Gdynia, increasing traffic safety. 
In rail transport, €126 million will help build the Szczecin Metropolitan Railway, 
connecting the main cities of Western Pomerania including Stargard, Police and 
Gryfino and benefitting 687,000 inhabitants. Almost €39 million will help purchase 
16 electric train units, which will operate in the Warsaw agglomeration. Almost 
€58 million will help modernise 152 passenger carriages and purchase 20 electric 
locomotives, which will circulate on the routes operated by PKP Intercity in the 
country. Finally, in road transport, Cohesion Policy will finance the construction 
of a section of the S7 express road linking Warsaw to Grójec (€129 million), a 
section of the A2 motorway between Warsaw’s southern bypass and Mińsk 
Mazowiecki (more than €78 million), a section of the S3 express road towards 
the Czech border in Lower Silesia (€105 million) and a section of the Olsztyn 
bypass in Warmińsko-Mazurskie (€87 million). These projects, all located on 
the Trans-European Transport Network, will increase road safety, reduce travel 
time and enhance territorial cohesion in the country.  
Id.
 117. Kavalski, supra note 42. 
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entanglement in European affairs than either Beijing or any European 
capital expected.”118  
III. LEGAL ASPECTS
A. Connectivity: EU Limits on CEEC/17+’s International 
Trade Agreements 
1. EU Limits on CEEC/17+1 
A significant domestic issue is that the “EU [is made of] twenty-eight 
states, those already with ‘good trade deals’ with China will be hesitant to 
support an EU-China FTA, even though the EU may have the legal authority 
under the Lisbon Treaty” to do so, as discussed below.119 Furthermore,
“Divergences between Member States’ interests are especially significant 
in the forging of the [EU’s] coherent external strategy, and, tensions between 
the [EU] and its individual member states weaken the [EU’s] overall 
influence. In the EU-China relations, these inconsistencies can be exploited.”120 
A political-legal issue is raised by the currently negotiated China-EU 
BIT as to the legal effect on the member states’ international trade agreements 
and current BITs with China.121 The EU retains sovereign authority over 
trade and investment agreements with third party countries, such as China.122 
Therefore, these agreements, such as the currently negotiated China-EU
BIT, once in place, would displace any inconsistent agreements entered
into by EU members states.123 
EU member states have since 1959 concluded 1384 BITs with third countries. 
Regulation 1219/2012 foresees that in the long run all member state BITs are
to be replaced by EU International Investment Agreements [IIAs] but does not 
118. Id.
 119. Brown, supra note 82, at 69. 
120.  Id. 
121. China is stepping up its efforts to reach an investment agreement with 
the European Union, with the vice-premier in charge of trade talks calling his
counterparts in Brussels on Friday. Liu He’s conversation with the European
Commission’s executive vice-president Valdis Dombrovskis came as officials
described the talks, which the two sides hope to conclude this year, as making
slow progress.
Stuart Lau, China Moves to Keep EU Investment Talks on Track, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Apr. 18, 2020, 11:30 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/ 
3080563/china-moves-keep-eu-investment-talks-track [https://perma.cc/4MHN-YKHC]. 
122. Stefanie Schacherer, Can EU Member States Still Negotiate BITs with Third 
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set a specific time frame. The current EU negotiating agenda will replace a part 
of existing member states’ BITs.124 
It is reported that “Germany has practically stopped negotiating new BITs 
because of the transfer of competency for FDI to the level of the European 
Union.”125 Therefore, it is not imprudent to predict the China-EU BIT will
eventually displace the existing bilateral agreements between China and 
EU members.126 
124. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, foreign direct
investment (FDI) falls within the common commercial policy of the European 
Union and, as such, became part of the sphere of exclusive competence of the 
European Union. The competence shift is evidenced by the negotiations of 
international investment agreements (IIAs) that the European Commission is 
conducting with a number of countries, including important economies, such as 
China and the United States. Against this background, third countries may be 
surprised when invited by individual EU member states to start bilateral investment 
treaty (BIT) negotiations. Does EU law allow member states to initiate BIT 
negotiations Only the European Union may legislate and adopt legally binding 
acts concerning areas within its exclusive competence. EU member states may 
only do so themselves if empowered by the European Union. Accordingly, it 
falls to the European Union to decide whether to empower member states to
conclude international treaties in fields of exclusive EU competence. This ‘re-
empowerment’ is usually adopted through secondary EU law (for example, EU
regulations) and is often used to provide for transitional arrangements concerning
areas over which the European Union newly acquired exclusive competence? 
Id.
 125. Axel Berger, Investment Treaties and the Search for Market Access in China 
(fn.1), INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 26, 2013), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/06/
26/ investment-treaties-and-the-search-for-market-access-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/DY9G- 
UN6D] (“As new European investment treaties will replace existing member state BITs 
and the number of German BITs will decrease in the years to come.”). However, Chancellor 
Merkel stated her support of an EU-China BIT, “Germany attaches great attention to the 
EU-China investment treaty, adding that the signing of the treaty will be a good start of 
negotiations on an EU-China free trade agreement.” See China, Germany Agree to Speed 
Up Talks on China-EU Investment Agreement, Enrich Bilateral Ties, XINHUA (June 2,
2017, 4:35 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-06/02/c_136332689.htm [https://
perma.cc/4KJT-KHMN].
126. See China-EU, BILATERALS.ORG (July 2014), https://www.bilaterals.org/?-
china-eu-[https://perma.cc/ZS6Q-GW7T]; Schacherer, supra note 122 (“Only the European
Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts concerning areas within its exclusive 
competence. EU member states may only do so themselves if empowered by the European 
Union. Accordingly, it falls to the European Union to decide whether to empower member 
states to conclude international treaties in fields of exclusive EU competence. This ‘re-
empowerment’ is usually adopted through secondary EU law (for example, EU regulations)
and is often used to provide for transitional arrangements concerning areas over which the 
European Union newly acquired exclusive competence.”); FAQ EU Competences and 
Commission Powers, EUR. COMM’N, https://europa.eu/citizens-initiative/faq-eu-competences-
 31
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As member states have fully conferred their sovereignty to the EU, the 
member states do not conclude individual trade agreements anymore. A 
brief summary of that conferral follows. 
Since the Treaty of Maastricht 92/93, Trade agreements are singlehandedly
negotiated by the European Commission, upon first receiving a negotiation 
mandate from the Council, which roughly sets their guidelines. When the Commission
finalized a deal with a partner country, both, the Council and the European Parliament
(since the Treaty of Lisbon 2007) get to vote on whether or not to adopt it with a 
Qualified and Simple Majority, respectively. The Investment part of an agreement,
however, must also be ratified by each of the 27 national parliaments, since the 
ECJ´s “Singapore Ruling” in 2017. Aside the ratification from investment treaties 
as can be seen in the EU-Canada Agreement, the conclusion of Trade Agreements
is otherwise much quicker and much more effective than if every single state
would do it by itself[.]127 
The European Commission further restricted Members’ Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) with non-EU countries.128 In 2012, the EU adopted a
“regulation creating a set of rules for bilateral investment agreements 
between individual EU members and non-EU countries, to make sure that 
they are consistent with EU law and the EU’s investment policy.”129 
The regulation sets the conditions for applying the more than 1400
bilateral investment agreements currently in force.130 The regulation also
creates the conditions for EU members to modify existing agreements and 
and-commission-powers_en [https://perma.cc/8FVW-LW7T] (explaining the ability of
the EU to supersede previous agreements). 
127. Eijk & Gunavardana, supra note 6; see also Joint Communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council Elements for a New EU Strategy on China 2016, at 4, COM 
(2016) 030 final (June 22, 2016). 
128. Investment Agreements Between EU Members and Non-EU Members, EUR. 
COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/investment/ [https://perma.cc/
YCC4-VWXJ].
129. Investment, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/ 
investment/ [https://perma.cc/7BJN-5DTV]; see also Commission Regulation 1219/2012, 
supra note 19. Polish experience in bilateral agreements “remains limited” in comparison 
to EU Member States that “have been involved in many bilateral agreements.” Project 
News: Bilateral Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding on Labour Migration. 




130. Council Notice (EU) 2018/C 149/01 of Apr. 27, 2018, List of the Bilateral
Investment Agreements Referred to in Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing Transitional Arrangements For 
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negotiate or conclude new ones.131 A summary of those conditions is as
follows. 
[T]hat the agreement is not in conflict with EU law; that the agreement is consistent
with the EU’s principles and objectives for external action; that the Commission 
did not submit or decide to submit a recommendation to open negotiations with
the non-EU country concerned, and; that the agreement does not create a serious
obstacle to the EU negotiating or concluding bilateral investment agreements
with non-EU countries.132 
2. BRI MOU Cooperation Agreements
When Italy signed on to the BRI, as had others in the CEEC/17+1, a 
question was raised: whether these “cooperation agreements (MOUs)” 
were to be considered as “trade agreements.”133 It is argued that the
Memorandum is merely a non-binding statement of intent that, if developed 
further into actual trade agreements, could violate EU law.134 The law in
this area is succinctly summarized below in a discussion of the cooperation 
agreement signed between Italy and China, which is the common language 
of MOUs signed by the 17+1. 
A particular aspect of the Memorandum stands out in this context. The second 
paragraph of the Memorandum concerns areas of cooperation and more specifically 
the third section herein discusses unimpeded trade and investment.135 Within this
section, the Memorandum discusses the aim of working towards expanding investment 
and trade and promoting market cooperation between the two countries. Although 
this section does not explicitly mention the creation of trade or investment agreements, 
if steps were made in the direction of creating binding intergovernmental 
131. Id.
 132. Investment, supra note 129. 
133.  First, it is argued, additional trade may not come. 
Whilst signing this MoU will come at a high political cost in Brussels, there is, 
however, no reason to believe that signing a MoU is a prerequisite for increased 
trade with China. Besides this, the Eastern European countries that already signed up 
on the BRI have complained that China’s big promises have not been materialised.  
Victor De Decker, Commentary: To BRI Or Not To BRI? Europe’s Warring Member States, 
ITALIAN INST. FOR INT’L POL. STUD. (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/
bri-or-not-bri-europes-warring-member-states-22786 [https://perma.cc/5HTS-Q76Y].
134.  Eijk & Gunavardana, supra note 6. 
135. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Italian
Republic and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation Within 
the Framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 










   




   
  
   
 
  










agreements that solidify the commitments set out in the Memorandum without
the approval of the EU, that would be at odds with EU law for the following two
reasons.
Firstly, trade policy is an exclusive competence of the EU. This means that only 
the EU can act internationally and not the Member States themselves. The scope 
of this EU trade policy has been expanded by the Lisbon Treaty and subsequent 
judgments and opinions of the Court of Justice of the EU, with for example 
Daiichi Sankyo136 and Opinion 2/15.137 It includes today explicitly foreign direct
investment. 
Secondly, under the duty of sincere cooperation, Member States are to “refrain
from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objectives” 
(Article 4, paragraph 3 TEU). The case law of the CJEU has interpreted this duty
widely and according to the Inland Waterways case, this duty includes situations 
where Member States negotiate agreements with third countries in parallel to the 
EU and on the same subject matter. Seeing that the EU launched negotiations for
an investment agreement with China in 2013, a new bilateral Italy-China investment
agreement under this BRI framework would thus amount to Italy violating the 
duty of sincere cooperation. 
Furthermore, modernizing the pre-existing bilateral investment treaty between
China and Italy from 1985 would also amount to a violation of EU law without 
proper coordination with the EU institutions. In addition, the fact that CJEU 
declared the arbitration clauses in bilateral investment treaties between the EU 
Member States illegal in the Achmea judgment, strengthens the case that any binding
investment agreement with investor-state dispute settlement made between Italy
and China in the future under the BRI umbrella could constitute a violation of EU
law, if not specifically authorized by the EU.138 
In sum, the Memorandum of Understanding is merely a political 
commitment, not a legal one. Therefore, absent further steps being taken 
to enter into trade agreements, there is no immediate conflict with CEEC’s 
legal obligations under EU law. If such steps were taken, then the divisive 
impact on the integrity and unity of the EU would be felt. 
136. Case C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd. v. DEMO Anonimos Viomikhaniki




137. See Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, Opinion 2/15: Maybe it is Time for the EU to
Conclude Separate Trade and Investment Agreements, EUR. L. BLOG (June 20, 2017), 
https://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/06/20/opinion-215-maybe-it-is-time-for-the-eu-to-
conclude-separate-trade-and-investment-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/5AKG-DZUQ]
(discussing issues with EU competence). 
138.  Eijk & Gunavardana, supra note 6. 
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B. Impact and Influence of Past and Future EU FTAs on CEEC 
With all of the EU’s diversity, the possibility of the EU and China
moving toward a closer economic relationship will ultimately be finalized
by an EU-China trade agreement that will supersede any EU Members’ 
inconsistent “deals” with China. Sources of developmental funding from 
BRI will not be affected, but the legal regime within which the BRI operates, 
is administered, and resolves disputes will be affected by an EU-China 
BIT and/or FTA. Therefore, it is useful to briefly assess possible influences 
on CEEC arising from past EU trade and investment treaties with the most 
recent being CETA.139 
Poland, by way of example of the CEEC, has explained that there are 
gains and losses.140  There are lost revenues and lost protections from lowered
tariffs in areas of the economy that were formerly protected under its bilateral 
agreements. Additionally, Poland was not in favor of the investment court 
of the dispute resolution provisions proposed in CETA, where companies 
could sue the government for losses.141 Despite the Polish protests, acceptance
of CETA and its benefits seemed to prevail, though some voices were raised 
in opposition to Poland’s ratification of CETA.142 Perhaps in the end, it
139. See CETA Explained, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/ceta_explained-
aecg_apercu.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/RZ5V-APBX] (“The Canada-European Union
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is a bilateral agreement between 
Canada and the EU. The agreement covers virtually all sectors and aspects of Canada-EU 
trade in order to eliminate or reduce barriers.”). 
140. See The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
Opening Up a Wealth of Opportunities for People in Poland (Feb. 2017), https://trade.ec. 
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/february/tradoc_155355.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUQ4-7BGD];
see also Maria Świetlik, PC Explains: How Will CETA Affect Poland?, POL. CRITIQUE 
(Jan. 4, 2017, 9:33 AM), http://politicalcritique.org/explains/2017/pc-explains-how-will-
ceta-affect-poland/ [https://perma.cc/H9WG-LU7Z].
141.  It argued the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
allows corporations to sue a state for lost revenues as a result of that state’s 
policies. The cases will be decided by judicial officers who are outside of that 
state’s normal judicial system. Despite the procedural changes introduced to 
CETA’s ISDS system, serious concerns remain. The right to sue operates only 
in one direction; states cannot sue companies for lost revenues as a result of 
that company’s conduct.  
Świetlik, supra note 140. 
142.  “One thing is clear, however, contrary to earlier declarations that it will defend
Polish agriculture and food, [the governing Law and Justice party] has announced full 
support for the adoption of CETA, the organisers of the protest said on social media.” In 
terms of CETA, Polish presidential aide Krzysztof Szczerski stated “that in order to fully 
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was recognized that the positive benefits and boosts to the economy
outweighed the concerns and long-term advantages of establishing the
ground rules of trade within the FTA as negotiated on an ongoing basis.143 
While some of the labor rights in CETA may test the limits of labor 
laws in Poland and CEE countries, only time will reveal whether the same 
provisions would be included in an EU-China FTA.144 All CEE countries, 
unlike China, have ratified all the core ILO labor provisions.145 
The influence of past FTAs is not yet known but it is worth noting that 
they help identify issues that the CEEC will need to address, along with
all EU countries, and the changes FTAs may bring to existing arrangements 
domestically and internationally. 
IV. ANALYSIS: CONNECTIVITY, DIVISIVENESS, OR 
PATHWAY TO EU-CHINA FTA? 
The best way to bring the EU and China’s economic relations closer in 
a coherent fashion is to expeditiously bind the relationship at the EU level,
rather than piecemeal by different member states or by the CEEC as they
grow their BRI trade and investments with China.146 
The clearest pathway to a successful bilateral [EU-China] FTA would build on
the existing EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation that places an EU-
enter into force, CETA requires to be ratified by all EU countries. ‘Poland has not lost the 
possibility to reflect on this issue.’” Protests in Polish Capital Against TTIP and CETA 
Deals, RADIO POL. (Oct. 15, 2016, 3:20 PM), http://archiwum.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/
275590 [https://perma.cc/7NJ8-PH58].
143. Discussion of the value of having rules with Western values arose in Polish
discussions about the possible TTIP. 
There are 1.77 million companies in Poland, of which 99.8 percent are small 
or medium enterprises (SMEs). The totality of companies generates 73 percent 
of the country’s GDP with the SMEs contributing 48.5 percent. However, when 
it comes to export, it is the SME’s who face the biggest obstacles in entering 
foreign markets, especially those outside the European Union. We also need to 
create good standards for free trade agreements and global regulatory and 
investment policies, especially now when similar processes are difficult to carry 
out within the World Trade Organization. As a long-term perspective we will 
see Asia (and later Africa) play a growing role independent of which models of 
international trade are adopted. This process will be safer if Western countries 
take part in the creation process for a framework of international trade.  
Inside TTIP: Discussing Pros and Cons with Polish Business Associations, EMERGING 
EUR. (Feb. 10, 2016), https://emerging-europe.com/interviews/inside-ttip-discussing-pros-
and-cons-with-polish-business-associations/ [https://perma.cc/BAN4-AKGF]. 
144. See Brown, supra note 82, at 69. 
145. See Ratifications of Fundamental Conventions by Country, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:10011:0::NO::P10011_DISP
LAY_BY,P10011_CONVENTION_TYPE_CODE:1,F [https://perma.cc/ZX3D-PJ9R].
146. Brown, supra note 82, at 72–73. 
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China BIT147 as central to the EU’s long-term bilateral relations with China.148 
The BIT would accelerate the process toward an FTA and create a more open and
transparent environment for increased flows of investment. It would also improve
investment for European and Chinese investors by creating investment rights and
guaranteeing non-discrimination, improving transparency, and providing investment 
rules on environmental and labor-related aspects of foreign investment, as all are 
potential obstacles for agreement on an FTA. As the BIT will likely replace existing
bilateral agreements between China and EU member states, the groundwork for
an EU-China FTA will already exist and could be integrated as was done in CETA 
and in the EU-Vietnam FTA.149 
The emergence of the 17+1 directly bears on EU-China cooperation,
and the optimistic view of the apparent competition of the EU and China 
to support financing infrastructure projects in the CEEC may logically
lead to closer relations and increased trade and investment, rather than
division of the EU. 
To arrive at the above conclusions, one begins with the massive amounts
of trade and investment China made in the CEEC under its BRI program.
Its penetration into the 17+1 countries is memorialized under BRI agreements, 
which are non-legal MOUs. However, it has caught the interest of EU 
officials who are concerned about China’s BRI bringing CEEC ever closer 
to China and potentially dividing the EU. As connectivity with China 
strengthens, it may wane with the EU and allow the EU to become 
divided.
147. Id.; For example, China also negotiates preferential trade investment agreements
(PTIA) of which four include comprehensive rules on investment. 
These treaties where negotiated with Pakistan (2006), New Zealand (2008), Peru 
(2009) and ASEAN (2009). The PTIA with Singapore just incorporates the China-
ASEAN investment agreement and the PTIA with Costa Rica from 2010 just 
reaffirms the China-Costa Rica BIT signed in 2007. The PTIA recently signed 
with Iceland follows this approach and ‘recognizes the importance’ (Art. 92) of
the China-Iceland BIT from 1994. 
Berger, supra note 125; EU-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) has also been referred 
to as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) and the terms appear to have 
flexibility as the latter may omit some terms present in a BIT. EU-China Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment (EU-China CAI), EUR. PARL. (Apr. 26, 2020), http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-
globalisation/file-eu-china-investment-agreement [https://perma.cc/ZP3Y-3B3F]. 
148. See EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, supra note 96, at 2. 
149. Brown, supra note 82, at 72–73; see also EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation, supra note 96, at 5; EU and China, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ 
policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/ [https://perma.cc/37VU-LGXN].
 37





   
  
     
   









   
 
 
The EU responded by determining China to be a “systemic rival and 
economic competitor.”150 At the same time, the EU continues to negotiate
a BIT with China and established the EU-China Connectivity Platform in 
2015, which offers mutually beneficial cooperation for infrastructure 
construction projects and seeks synergy with China’s BRI and the EU’s 
Trans-European Transport Network. 
The EU also introduced its Cohesion Fund providing billions of dollars 
for member states with low Gross National Income levels, such as many 
CEEC, for funding a vast number of infrastructure projects.
While the EU rejected becoming a BRI partner, it does not seek to interfere
with BRI. Instead, the EU recognizes the BRI as additional funding to build
up the EU and CEEC. 
The CEEC, and by way of illustration, Poland, has struggled to overcome 
economic vestiges from its former political regimes. Lower wages, better 
job opportunities, and higher standards of living have motivated many
CEEC workers to emigrate to more wealthy EU countries, like Germany. 
This creates labor shortages that are filled by an influx of immigrants from 
Ukraine and other countries. China, with its BRI investments, brings in many
of its own workers. Thus, there is flux in the availability of professional 
workers, causing some pause to would-be Chinese BRI investors in CEEC; 
but, nevertheless, trade and investment between the 17+1 and China continues. 
On the legal front, EU law is clear that any international trade agreements
cannot be negotiated by CEEC or any EU Members. BITs, or other existing
trade agreements, of CEEC or EU members cannot be inconsistent with
EU law. If such agreements are found to be inconsistent, then they must 
be modified in a manner consistent with EU law and will be superseded
by a subsequent EU-China BIT or FTA. 
While the current BRI MOU Cooperation Agreement does not create
an international trade agreement, it possible to expand this agreement in 
such a way as to violate the EU’s legal exclusivity over international trade 
agreements.
In the final analysis, EU and China are already greatly connected in trade
and investment. The economic activities of CEEC under the BRI put EU 
and China on a mutually supportive footing rather than a divisive one for the
EU. Further, the continuing cooperation between CEEC and China shines 
a light on the pathway toward a future EU-China BIT and FTA with agreed
upon ground rules affecting CEEC and all of the EU in diverse yet connective 
and beneficial ways. 
150. Strategic Outlook, supra note 11. 
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V. CONCLUSION
With China seeking to be a global leader and finding some success in 
that role as United States leadership wanes under its current leadership, it 
may be in EU’s best interests to cement a trade deal with China, while at
the same time including a full measure of Western values. This connectivity
will house the trade activities of the CEEC, cut back on potential 
divisiveness, and lay out a pathway along the old Silk Road to increase 
EU-China trade and investment under a regulating FTA. 
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